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These comments are directed towards the concern of the 
Federal Communications Commission over developing rules with 
respect to subscription television (STV or Pay-TV) that would 
permit the development of the industry if it offered a n��t 
increment to the number of options and the diversity of 
programming available to viewers, bu·t that would prevent the 
diversion of programming that is currently available to 
viewers over the free, over-the-air system to a pay mode .. 
The premise of these comments is·that the commission is 
obviously correct in its conclusion that viewers and, £01: that 
matter, American society would be unambiguously worse of1E if 
STV succeeded only in causing essentially the existing 
systein of broadcasting simply to begin charging viewers for 
programs that they now receive free. A careful examination 
of the consequences of an all-STV system makes obvious the source 
of popular opposition to pay-TV and makes dubious the allure of 
such a system for some economists. The existing commercial 
broadcasting system generates consumer satisfaction of enormous 
value -- worth perhaps as much as $20 billion annually -·w in 
providing free of charge its current array of mass-audience 
programming. TO pay for exactly the. same programming now 
available without charge would mean a massive reduction in the 
welfare of most fa'Tiilies. The realization of this has g�;nerated 
political support £or bans or limitations on the development 
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of pay-TV, and has moved the commission to try to develop a 
complicated web of antisiphoning rules intended to prevent the 
supplanting of the existing commercial system by subscription 
television. 
The most recent Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making 
(FCC 74-878) invited another round of debate on the details 
of the antisiphoning rules. The underlying reason for the 
persistence of this issue before the Commission is that the 
current rules are, according to the cable television and 
subscription television industries, too stringent to permit 
full develop:nent of STV, These comments are intended t.o examine 
why this. might be so, and whether further relaxation of the rules 
would lead to an STV system that merely substituted a pay system 
for a free one. Before examining the effects of the rules in 
detail, it is necessary to assess the economic potential of 
STV: how many customers it might reasonably be expected to have, 
what kind of program.�ing it would offer, how much it could pay 
for first-class programming of the kind available over the 
existing commercial system, and how extensive the threat of 
progra� siphoning really is. 
Much of the debate over the effects of STV boils down to a 
disagreement over the nature of the demand for television: . is 
the effective demaI'.d for ST! so great that , if given free reins, 
it would sti.pplc.nt the present co:i.�mcrcial syst'2:n, and is the 
composition of dema::-1:1 sue!"'. 'that a switch to a pay mode would cause 
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present program types to be supplanted by significantly different 
programming? While the lf:Vidence relevant to these empirical questions 
is sparse, it is nonetheless sufficient to be interesting. 
The most relevant information comes from the experiences of 
the few STV systems that have been launched during the past 
twenty years. In the early 1960?• three rather extensive, albeit 
temporary, STV systems were operated.: one in Hartford, another 
in Etobicoke, Ontario, a suburb of Toronto, and a third in Los 
Angeles and San Francisco. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
less ambitious systems were also operated in Bartlesville, Chicago, 
Los Angeles, Palm Springs_ 
and San Francisco.1 All but the 
Hartford system, which used a UHF television station, were operated 
on cable television syst�ms. These early attempts to launch S'IV 
are often referred to as "experiments," but this is probably a 
misnomer. They were experiments only in that (1) government 
authorities in Canada and the United States regarded them as tests 
and, consequently, when governmental acquiescence was req:uired, 
were willing to suspend at least temporarily the otherwise dim view 
that they normally took towards the idea of paying for ti=!levision, 
and (2) businessmen gained some experieI'.ce in dealir.g with the 
l In the past few years, several cable television systems have also 
introduced STV channels� however, almost no information is publicly 
available on the financial.details of their operation. 
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technical and marketing facets of STV. But these early systems 
were not designed to provide clear answers to the empirical questions 
most relevant to the development of public policy: would popular 
programs now on free TV switch to pay if given the opportunity, 
and would STV significantly affect program diversity? The early 
systems practiced neither the variation in prices nor the 
diversification in programming that would be necessary to provide 
conclusive evidence on these questions. Nevertheless, the results 
provide some support for the following conclusions: ( 1) STV 
probably would be economically viable in a few large cities if 
broadcast over present UHF independent �tations, in a few more 
cities if offered on VHF stations, and relatively widely if.STV 
channels in large cities and on cable combined to form an STV 
network; (2) STV poses only a minor threat to free, over-the-
air television, sir.i.ce only a few, unique events, such as a world's 
championship sports contest or great movies, would be likely t o  
generate more profits o n  STV than on free TV; ( 3 )  while there is 
support for the notion that some types of programs that are not 
now shown on free TV would be economically viable on STV, it is not 
likely that STV would concentrate primarily on such programming 
and thereby greatly increase telev�sion diyersityr and (4) on the 
contrary, the staple fare of STV is likely· to be quite similar 
to that of free TV (and of other mass cor:ununications media): light 
entertainment {recent popular movies, sports, variety programs) 
oriented towards a relatively large segment of the viewing public. 
- 5-
General Economic Viability of a Single Pay Station 
Unfortunately, for only the Hartford system has re:latively 
complete financial information been made public. Table: 1 repro-
duces a summary financial report given by Teco, rnc • •  a subsidiary 
of zenith Radio corporation, to the FCC. According to the Teco 
calculations, the Hartford system, needed 20, 000 subscribers to 
break even. In order to·earn an 18 percent pretax rate of return 
to equity (the average for U.S. industry), the system woUld have 
requ�red about 75,000 subscribers. By contrast, the Hartford 
system peaked at slightly under 5,000 subscribers while operating 
on. a weak UHF station that, when operated in the normal commercial 
mode, had a net weekly circulation of about 100, 000 homes. Assuming 
that the well-known ·reception difficulties in the UHF band halved the 
l' 
system's potential penetration, so that on VHF the system would 
have achieved twice the number of subscribers, a Hartford-like 
system would capture normal profits only in broadcasting areas 
containing more than about 900,000 homes, of which there are only 
twelve. On UHF television, Hartford-style STV wocld be profitable 
only in areas with more than about 1.75 million television ho�es, 
of which there are only four. 
These results should not be taken too seriously. :l"irst; tti.ey 
blithely ignore some important influences on the potential market 
1 Econometric analyses of the audience shares of stations have 
shown the "UHF handicap" to be very close to 50 percent., 
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Table 1: Restatement ori a Per-subscriber Basis of Zenith-Telco's 
Breakeven Projection for Subscriotiol). __ Televi_s ion System 
(Variable income and expense items) 
�
Prograins 
Decoder rental 
Installation 
Total income 
Expenses 
Program product 
Sales and commissions 
Franchise feec 
Technical 
Taxes(other than federal) 
Supplies, truck, bad debts, other 
Depreciationd 
Total variable expense 
Gross margin before fixed expense 
(Fixed expense itemse) 
Station time 
Administrative salaries 
Program staff 
Lines and facilities 
Fees to Broadcast Music, Inc., and American 
Society of composers, Authors and Publishers 
IBM. equipment rental 
Rent 
Legal, audit, insurance, travel, telephone, 
utilities, dues, maintenance 
Total fixed expenses 
(Per subscriber) 
65.00 
39.00 
2.ooa 
106.oob 
22.75 
8.15 
5.20 
7 .93 
2.22 
3.10 
27.09 
76.44 
29.56 
{Per station) 
300,00Q 
94,000 
23,000 
32,000 
18.000 
8_8,000 
15,000 
20,000 
590,000 
Breakeven point: $590,000 � $29.56 = 20,000 subscribers 
Source: Prepared by the Federal Communications Commission staff as part 
of Docket 11279 on subscription television service, from data supplied 
by Zenith Radio Corporation and Teco, Inc., on the basis of the Hartford 
zubscription television experiment. Reproduced in subscription 7ele­
vision, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Communications and Power 
of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Corrunerce, 90 Cong. 
1 sess. (1967), P. 131. 
· 
a. zenith-Teco assumes 20 percent turnover, or 4,000 per year. 
This gives a total of $40,000 installation income, or 52 subscriber 
(of which there are 20,000 at the breakeven point). 
b. The figure is somewhat lower than the 1962-64 average because it
counts on lower installation revenues in the long run. 
c. Five percent of program and rental inco�e 
d. Primarily for decoders. 
e. Some fixed expenses increase slightly with increased income. 
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for S1'V. Because of the publicness of a television broc::dcast 1 
there are enormous economies of scale captured by systems in large 
citi es. This means. among other things, that the most profitable 
level of prograrn qu<\l.j..ty is higher in a larger city. Presumably 
STV systems in largE;tr cities would offer better programming, which 
might be insufficient even to attract as large a share of TV homes 
as did Hartford since larger cities have more broadcasting and other 
entertainment alternatives. 
A second problem with the estimates is that the break-even 
number of subscribers is very sensitive to small changes in costs 
and revenues. If, for example, .revenues per subscriber were 
five percent higher, the number of subscribers that would yield 
normal profits falls by more than 30 percent, to about 50,000. 
The fact that Hartford constitutes a single data point for making 
such an estimate is cause enough to generate some concern for 
the ccuracy of the estimates of how many cities are potential 
viable sites for STV. But, in addition, some of the costs in the 
Teco financial summary are almost assuredly incorrect. For one, 
the "program product" is entered as $22.75 per subscribers; however, 
as pointed out above, scale economies are i::ure to make this number 
lower -- for a better product -- in larger cities. The existing 
market for syndicated television programs reveals this pattern. The 
typical program rental fee is a fixed dollar amount plus a.n additional 
1 Even when a device is installed for "privatizing" broadcasts in 
the sense that nonpayors can be excluded, it is still true that the 
true marginal.cost of adding a viewer is essentially zero. 
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fee per household in that sta'tion's market. In addition, the 
franchise fee is an internal transfer within the Teco corporate 
family, paid for the use of the Zenith-Tcco signal-scrambling 
and b�lling system. It is at least in part profits of the STV 
system, and in a world in which the devices used to privatize 
television signals were produced competitively, the franchsie 
fee would probably not be collected. Finally, the $300,000 
fee for station time would vary widely from market to market •• 
The fee represents the net revenue the station could earn if it· 
operated as a normal commercial independent, which reflects the 
size of its market and the scarcity of channel assignments in 
that area. Since most UHF independent stations lose money, 
including the Hartford station, in the long run the minimum 
franchise fee would probably have to be higher than $300,000. 
Eventually these stations will either have to begin to show profits 
or leave the air. 
on cable systems, the $300,000 franchise fee would all but 
disappear. Transmission costs on cable are $5 to $10 per hour 
at most, so that the transmission cost of operating a Hartford-style 
STV channel is probably around $10,000 annually. This cuts the 
breakeven number of subscribers by 10,000. These subscribers 
probably could be spread over several different cable systems 
within a few counties with little effect on costs or the magnitude 
of break-even operations. 
While these results are hardly definitive, they do suggest 
a rcnult that is almost squarely in the middle of the pro and con 
arguments presented at the outset. A single-station :STV operation 
is probably viable in a few large cities, but it will not be so 
profitable that existing VHF stations (even most VHF independents) 
are likely to become pay outlets. A single STV operation spread 
over a few cable systems that are close enough togeth1:r geOgraphically 
to be managed from a single location is also probably viable, so long 
as cable systems with an adequate number of subscribe:rs ·already 
exist so that STV can gain access to enough viewers at the incre­
mental cost of activating one more cable channel. In either case, 
STV is neither much of a threat nor much of a promise,, ranking 
roughly on a par with VHF independent stations as an ��conomic 
factor in the industry. Of course, to those (including myself} who 
would like to have access to a Hartford-style STV system, offering 
recent movies at $1.50 each without corrunercial interruptions, this 
conclusion is hardly unimportant. But it does not constitute a revo­
lution in broadcasting, as many proponents and opponents have claimed 
it wouldo 
General Economic Viability of Network STV 
As is the case in conventional broadcasting, networking and 
national program syndication provide scale economies -t�o an STV 
system, 
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and probably wou'ld make it economically viable in much of the nation 
if network STV were offered on existing independent stations and on 
all but the smallest cable systems. 
For a national system, the first cost entry in Table 1 would be 
covered at the national level, since the additional programming 
costs for adding another station to the network are zero. This 
increases the gross margin per subscriber to $52, and drops the 
minimum number of subscribers needed to achieve normal pro�its 
for a UHF station to under 20,000, or on a cable STV system to 
under 10,000. Assuming that five percent of the potential 
audience would subscribe to STV over-the-air, the minimum viable 
size market for a UHF S'IV station in an S'IV network would be 400,000 
homes, which is roughly the size of the fiftieth largest television 
market. If STV were offered in the fifty largest markets and on 
large cable systems, about half the nation would have access to the 
service. 
To calculate the viability of this kind of a system, costs 
and revenues must now be brought to current dollars since programming 
costs have, in the past ten years, risen more rapidly than have prices 
in general. Results of these calculations are shown in Table 2. The 
revenues per subscriber in Table 1, when converted to 1974 dollars, 
are about $175. Assuming that half the TV homes were offered STV 
and that five perceut subscribed and spent as did Hartfo�d ·subscribers, 
this yields a total annual revenue for the system of about $285 
r:iillion. Ti"'.e costs that depe:J.d upon the nt�mber of subscribers are, 
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in current dollars, about $11.50 for the 1.7 million subscribers 
projected for the system. Fixed costs per station (in.eluding 
opportunity costs) are assumed to be about $1 million, which should 
be close to the amount required from STV for long-term survival of UHF 
,independents, assuming an STV system, like Hartford's, that only 
absorbs four to five hours per day of a station•s time. cable 
system costs are based on the assumption that one STV office 
resembling that of an STV UHF station can operate STV channels
on several nearby cable systems. The costs for such a cable 
operator are the same as for a UHF station except that no station 
fee is paid but about $10,000 per cable system is paid for channel 
use. Microwave interconnection facilities are assumed to be 
leased by the STV system for distributing programs to i�tations and 
cable systems at roughly the cost now charged to networks. 
TABLE 2: Ali/'t'WAL COSTS AND REVED.1UES OF NATIONAL STV 
(millions) 
REVENUES $285 
EXPENPES 
Programs $175 
subs��iber costs 20 
station costs 50 
Cable costs 10 
(20 regional systems) 
Interconnection _.1Q_
$275 
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�rogramming costs in ·Table 2 are, for want of a better 
benchrr.ark, baSed upon the prices currently paid by networks for 
first-run movies. Generally, networks pay about $750,000 for 
the right to show a two-hour movie three times in prime time 
during one progranuning year. This works out to be about 
$125,000 per hour of broadcast time. It is assumed that this 
represents reasonable estimate of programming costs for STV, 
an heroic asstunption si�ce (1) other television programs are less 
expensive than movie rights including movies "made for television," 
which are about half, as expensive as regular movies, and (2) movie 
rights fees are pure rents (the true costs of releasing a two-year­
old movie for television use are zero, and for most movies even the 
opportunity costs are essentially zero since the gate potential of 
most movies has been close to exhausted within two years afteE 
its release). A t  any rate, this figure generates a total cost for 
STV programming for one year of about $175 million. 
As the calCulations in Table 2 reveal, a national system along 
the lines described is right on the borderline of viability. The costs 
and revenues as calculated are sufficiently close that, given the un­
reliability of the basic data, the absolute difference of $10 million 
is of far less meaning than that the numbers came out so close. 
Obviously, the future of STV depends critically on two 
factors: the extent of growth of cable television and the se�sitivity 
of system revenues to departures from the price'structure charged 
in Hartford. STV on cables would avoid the station fees, as discussed 
above, and the signal handicaps assocaited with UHF stations. 
-13-
The relationship between cable and STV may well be symbiotic: in 
the present regulatory environment with severe restrictions on 
which stations a cable system may retransmit, cable probably can not 
attain many more subscribers than ten to fifteen percent of television 
homes; at the same time, an extensive national STV system may not 
develop unless it gains access to the inexpensive, VHF-quality 
channels that could only be provided by an extensive na tional cable 
industry. 
Pricing policies other than those practiced in Hartford might 
generate greater revenues and more profits. AS noted a:oove, the 
Hartford system engaged in very little price experimentation. 
Subscribers were charged a flat weekly rate (95 cents) :plus an 
additional charge per program. Eighty-five percent of all programs 
were priced between $1.00 and $1.50 in the evening. Mo:st other 
programs were priced between $1.00 and $1.50 except for the second 
Ali-Liston heavyweight championship fight ($3.00), educ::i.tional 
programs {50 cents to 75 cents) and a few college and h:Lgh school 
basketball games (25 cents to $1.00). Since different price structures 
were not tried, there is no reason to believe that the Hartford system 
found the profit maximizing set of prices. In fact, ev:Ldence from 
the other early systems suggests the contrary. 
:rn the Etobicoke operations. movies· of comparable quality 
were available at $1.00 and $1.25. It was reported that the 
1125% increase in price for motion pictures of high cri� tic al 
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merit • • •  proved to be no deterrent. "_J/ The audience penetration 
was about 20 percent for the $1.25 movies and 23 percent for the 
$1.00 movies, a statistically insignificant difference that, in any 
event, led to higher revenues at the higher prices. Prices for 
hockey games were increased from $1.00 to $1.50 with no change in 
audience. These data suggest that, within the range of prices 
charged in the experiments, higher program charges might well 
increase revenues and profits. 
'rhe major price deterrent to the popularity of STV appears 
to be the anriual charge. As Table 3 suggests, systems that have 
none appear to achieve the higher rates of penetration. In the 
Etobicoke experiment, the introduction.of an annual charge -- lower 
than Hartford's -- was associated with a significant loss of 
subscribers • ...1..J The annual charge is an especially strong disincentive 
to subscribing for the less frequent user and forces all viewers to 
place a value on a year's subscription in advance. 
The fixed annual charge was designed to cover the high expense 
of the decoder, which precludes nonpayers from viewing and 
serves to record selections. In Hartford, over a third of total costs 
were attributable to the decoder. Another advantage of cable is 
..1_J' Subscription Television, He�rings before the Subcommittee on 
co�munications and Power, House Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign commerce 90 Cong. 1st session (1967), p.370. 
-1..J Pr'ior to the <.t.nnual charge, the system had as many as 5,500 
subscribers; after its introduction, subscriptions dropped 
to 2,500, eve!'l. thoug:i. the area served by the cable had been 
expanded. use of ST\T, however, was much greater by the 
smalle::: group. 
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that by using the two-way capability that is now required on new 
systems, the process of decoding and billing is much simpler and 
cheaper. It can easily be shown using Table l costs (with much 
reduced collection costs and with programming costs that are not 
dependent upon the number of subscribers) and Table 3 revenue and 
penetration results that the San Francisco and Los Angeles operations. 
with lower revenues per subscriber �ut a much higher proportion of 
the potential audience subscribing, would, on cable systems of ariy 
fixed· size� be more profitable than would a system based upon the 
Hartford price structure._J/Over the air, however, both price 
structures generate about the same amount of net revenues • .£_/ 
Table 3. Penetration apd Average Expenditure for Four Subscription 
Television Systems, __ Various Yea.i:::s_, 1962-64 
Average annual 
STV system & year Penetration a expenditure Annual charge 
Etobicoke, 1962 
Etobicoke, 1964 
Hartford, 1963 
Los Angeles, 1964 
_S_an_:Francisco, 1964 
_{Q_ercent) ___ (_dollars)_ 
45 33 
12 65 
3.5 100 
31 60 
20 61 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Source: Oxtoby-Smith, 11Consumer Response to Pay TV -- An 
Interim Report on the Conclusion of a Study in Los Angeles after STV 
Initiation'* (New York: Oxtoby-Smith, Inc., 1965; processed), p. 29. 
a. Penetration is the proportion of households in the i>ervice area 
that subscribe. · 
!_/ Hartford generates about three times as much revenue net of 
variable costs per subscriber, but Los Angeles and San Francisco 
generate between six and nine times as many subscribers4 
£...! Hartford produces revenues that fall between those of Los Angeles 
and San Francisco, assuming t.�ey all face the same cost structure 
and size of potential audience. 
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The Comoosition of Proararnming on STV 
The major offeringa of STV systems thus far have been recent 
movies and sports events. Of course, it is not surprising that 
this result transpired. STV has never had enough subscribers to 
enable it to afford to produce its own programming. Instead, it 
has had to rely on material produced for other media and available 
to STV at very minimal marginal costs. Whatever special possibilities 
might inhere in home television for providing innovative forms of' 
entertainment or even instruction are not likely to emerge until 
the potential STV market is much larger than it was while the 
early systems were operating. 
The Hartford system did attempt to provide occasional programs 
other than the standard fare of movies and sports. Most of these 
programs were videotapes of performances in theatres and nightclubs, 
or of programs offered in other cities on independent stations but 
not available in Hartford because the city lacked any independent 
stations other than the STV outlet. The principal exception was 
educ�tional programming. The Hartford station produced several 
discussion programs featuring Yale professors, with, perhaps predictably, 
disastrous box office results (one program on the American economy 
attracted one viewer at 50¢, another on politics had an audience of 
zero). 
Table 4 breaks down the Hartford programming into several categories. 
It shows the distribution of progra�s by type. the average audience 
rating and price in each type, and the ave�age revenue per program 
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that would have been generated had the Hartford system been offered to 
everyone -- 60 million television homes in 1963 -- and had subscriptions 
nationally been 4. 5 percent of all homes offered service, as was the 
case at the end of the Hartford experiment. Again, the exact figures 
in the last column have little meaning exCept for their rough 
magnitudes, for they are extremely sensitive to the assumptions 
about the number of subscribers. These numbers are also in 1963 
dollars: 1974 equivalents are about two-thirds higher. 
No attempt has been made to provide categorizations of movies. 
The movies that were offered were relatively new, and representative 
of those that had been shown in locql theatres in the few years 
before and during the experiment. Foreign language films and 
avant garde productions were not presented. Since others have 
shown that typologies of movies are essentially useless as measures 
of quality or attractiveness,.1_/ no attempt was made to analyze STV 
revenues according to such breakdowns. 
Among the remaining progra.rn types, further analysis is 
severely limited by the relatively small number of programs offered 
in most groups. For exa."tlple, the proponents of STV' cite serious 
:u Edward Greenberg and Harold J. Barnett, "1V Program Diversity -­
New Evidence and Old Theories," AER V. LXI (May 1971). The 
authors found that the seven-way classification of movi·�s practiced 
by the industry rr.ad2 no contribution to explaining the audience 
ratings of movies on network tel"evision. They concluded that 
if distinct groups of viewers according to program tastes exist, 
the dimensions of quality on which their tastes differ ar e otb.er 
than those measured by movie type. 
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music and drama as categories of programs that STV is likely to 
present, but in Hartfo:i:-d only six programs were offered in the very 
general class of opera, concerts and ballet, and only eleven in the 
class of broadway plays and other dramatic productions. In the 
sports category, one use of STV that is frequently mentioned is 
as a device for presenting local college and high school .s:ports events. 
Again, Hartford offered only one high school basketball game, and that 
at the low price of 25¢, and seven collegiate events. In sum, the 
confidence that can be placed in the extent to which the Hartford 
results ·can be generalized would have been much greater if' many 
more programs other than movies would have been offered, making the 
average re.sults within categories more reliable and allowing for 
much more detailed categorization� 
with this caveat in mind, the Hartford data do indicate that 
consumer tastes, with a few exceptions, produce resurts on STV that 
are similar to those on free television. Movies and popular enter-
tainment generated the most revenue per program. The most popular 
sporting event was championship boxing, which is consistent with 
the fact that only boxing regularly offers the video version of its 
best events in theatres rather than over free television. At the 
other extreme, professional hockey did poorly on Hartford STV, just 
as it does poorly on free TV (hockey has the lowest audience rating 
of all sports on television, ranking just below televised fishing). 
The results for high school basketball are really not of any value --
a high rating at a very low cost for one game. 
The few_ pr?grams of a. more serious nature also did re.::i.sonably 
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well. The serious music category was just below popular entert�inment 
in revenues, while dramatic productions generated 50 to 60 percent 
of the revenue of the popular items -- which, incidentally, corresponds 
roughly to the difference in audience ratings on free television 
between serious dramatic porductions (such as Hallmark Hall of Fame) 
and movies. 
Since most of the programs on the Hartford sys tern were of 
about 90 to 120 minutes duration, a rough approximation of their 
costs would be about $350,000- to $400,.000 for each program in 1974 
dollars, which is roughly the prorated current cost of regular series 
and made-for-TV movies on the networks. For purposes of comparison 
with Table 4, this is a cost of $180, 000 to $250,000 in 1963 dollars. 
For movies, the 1963 equivalent price is less than $500,·ooo. 
Compared with this benclunark, the Hartford data suggest that 
mov�es, boxing, serious music and popular variety programs are most 
likely to generate revenues adequate to cover costs on national STV. 
The next category, comprising program types that are on the 
borderline of viability, includes most other sports events {except, 
of ccurse, for the major professional sports other than hockey, 
which were not tested in Hartford and probably would do better) and 
dramatic productions. These results emphasize a dual role for STV 
which has �ct.generally been reC09nized, and indeed once again 
places it squarely in the middle of the expectations of most 
proponents and opponer.ts. 
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First, serious mu.Sic did well in Hartford. Dr31Tla, how.�ver, 
had only mixed success; The average program, shown three t:i..mes, 
generated about $325, 000 in revenues on a national scale, about 
equal to the cost of made-for-TV movies. A few programs did 
very well, such as lighter Broadway productions ("Wake Up D<•rling" 
and "Tchin-Tchin"), while most of the more serious plays (stich as 
"Hedda Gabbler" and "Androcles and the Lion") drew very small 
audiences. 
The. viability of this heavier programming probably depE!nds very 
greatly o.n cost estimates -- and the extent to which progrant costs 
contain rents that producers would not demand from STV unle.s:s 
the medium were a great financial success. To film and broadcast 
properly a single performance of the Metropolitan Opera or a. Broadway 
play, neglecting payments to the performers, would cost on the 
order of $50,000 to $100,000� while the producers could earn revenues 
several times these figures on a national STV system. A series of 
symphony concerts, featuring three broadcasts each of ten separate 
concerts of the leading orchestras, might generate revenues in 
excess of production costs of at least $1.S million. How much of 
this would actually go to the STV system and how much to producers 
and performers is, of course, inestimable. 
The second aspect of STV, generally neglected, is the overwhelming 
support for several categories of lighter entertainment. Thia Hartford 
station, with its low budget, could not experi.raent with the :staple of 
free TV, the regular series, but all other categories found .i.n the 
usual TV fare did very well, earning revenues that easily would cover 
p�oduction costs. 
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The Experiments and the A.�tisiphoning Rules 
The overriding implication of the preceeding analysis is 
that the concern over substantial diversion of popular, con­
ventional programming to STV is probably unwarranted. Past 
experience supplies two guides on this issue: the existing 
network systems are highly profitable and, according to the 
Hartford results, only a small fraction of viewers are willing 
to pay the steep prices -- about $12 monthly that exper imerit 
charged. Even if half the nation were wired to cable or living 
in cities with over-the-air STV, and if 20 percen"t, rather 
than 4 percent. of these homes subscribed to STV at $10 monthly, 
and viewed it half of the time, network audiences (and �dvertising 
revenues} would decline only by 5 percent. While such a loss 
would reduce profits in the network system by about one-fourth, 
it \\Ould still leave the industry a 45 percent after-tax rate of 
return on investment, significantly above average. Meanwhile, the 
STV systems would raise revenues 0£ $720 million from subscribers. 
since no technical limit wocld restrict the nwnber of cable STV 
systems that could be formed, or received by a viewer, competition 
would cause them to multiply until profits per system Cwindled to 
average for b�siness generally •. With costs $250 :r,illion annually 
at most, two or three STV systems, in addition ot the three 
existing networks, would be viable, all pr oducing progranuning of 
roughly the current quality of network fare. Of course, the STV 
penetration'and viewing figures asswned are very high -- five 
times as high·as Hartford. A final result much closer to the 
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Hartford projection is a more reasonable expectation. 
Substantial program erosion is unlikely even in the most 
favorable STV environment. If �O million homes become cable 
subscribers or are offered over-the-air STV, if 10 percent of these 
subscribe to STV, and if 12 percent of these are willing to pay $1 
to watch, say, a single showing of an hour-long episode of the 
most popular .network shows, the STV revenues would be about $360,000 
per showing. These revenues·are subst�ntially less than the 
shows n�w generate from advertising on free network TV. Yet 
they are .large enough that each STV subscriber would have 
to pay nearly $200 a year for pay Programs in order for revenues 
to be that high. 
The preceding analysis goes much further than is necessary to 
justify a permissive attitude toward STV. As long as channel 
capacity on cable is reasonably large, and as long as a lar·ge 
fraction of the nation remains unwired, the alleged dangers of 
STV to the existing broadcasting system are illusory. 
The principal exceptions to this generalization are a few 
highly popular, special events such as major athletic championships. 
The reception of the STV audience to chamiponship boxing bears 
out the possibility that these especially attractive events might 
draw more revenues from STV. Such events are sufficiently infrequent 
that large numbers of households could affort to pay a substantial 
charge for viewing them without experiencing disastrous consequences 
with respect to the family entertainment budget -- which is not the 
case with the regular fare of television, the regularly 
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scheduled movie, sports event or series. Given the political 
climate with respect to STV, it is unlikely that the industry 
would attempt to divert these events from conunercial television, 
but even so the Commission is undoubtedly correct in ruling 
that such events can not switch to STV. 
The point of the rules relating to motion pictures is less 
obvious. The current rule is costly to STV not because it 
prevents competition between STV and broadcasters, but because 
it denies STV access to programming resources that are not 
used by broadcasters. First run theatre exhibition of motion 
pictures is simply too valuable to make either commercial 
television or STV competitors for movie rights immediately 
after a .picture is released. For the more interesting pictures, 
lucrative theatre exhibition is likely to be possible for well 
over a year', especially if ,the film is nominated for major 
awards. Obviously, the motion picture companies would prefer 
to keep the picture earning the high revenues from theatre 
exhibition as long as that is possible, so that negotiations
 for 
release to STV much in adv�nce of the end of the major thea
tre runs 
�re net feasible. Thus, the two-year limitation, given the 
lead time required by STV systems for negotiating the rights 
and scheduling showings, prevents.them from having access to many 
of the best films. 
All of the alternatives men�ioned in the Further Notice 
will give STV systems more flexibility in scheduling movies, 
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particularly the most popular movies that have long theatre runs. 
It is highly doubtful that any relaxation of the 2-10 year rule 
will have an appreciable impact upon the availability of prc•­
gramming for corrunercial television. Most importantly, the 
program production industry -- firms that produce series, 
specials, made-for-TV movies and movies exhibited first in 
theatres -- is highly competitive and able to respond quite rapidly 
to changes in the demand for its product. Mortality of firms 
in the industry is very high, with about forty percent of the 
firms selling their first program in one year going out of 
business by the next, and with several times as many program:s 
for sale each spring as are eventualiy purchased by networks 
or independent stations. If STV significantly increases the 
profitability of the movie �nd program production industries,, 
the response will be a sul,stantial increase in the production 
of both movies and programs made directly for television, 
rather than a decline in the programming available to conunercial 
television. 
Another important feature of the current television industry 
is that owners of the rights to motion pictures appare�tly do 
much better at bargaining with networks over exhibition fees 
than do series producers: the maximwn share of advertising 
income fro m movie showings on television that could be paid 
to owners of movie rights without causing networks to lose 
money on moives has been estimated as 45 percent; the actual 
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payments for movies average over 40 percent of advertising income.lj
This means that holders of movie rights release movies to television 
roughly at the point when networks can finally outbid the income 
from theatre exhibition -- that is to say, largely on the terms 
of the movie producers. Since the typical movie is not released 
to television for several years after it is made, it is apparent 
that motion pictures are being withheld from television now well past 
the first run of pictures. In this environment, it is conceivable 
that ST\1 would actually reduce the average wait between release 
in theatres and showing on conunercial tele'-:ision. If the 
release to STV is towards the end of the first theatre run and 
serves primarily as a replacement for showings at neighborhood 
theatres several years after release, then the principal effect 
of STV would be to provide a quicker, more effective way for 
motion picture companies to capture the relatively ·low-priced 
second and third run exhibitions. The main attractions of the 
second and third run, neighborhood theatre exhibition are 
economy (ticket prices are lower than for first run showings) 
and convenience (theatres are closer to home and seldom have 
long waiting lines). STV is well suited to satisfy this market, 
since it can be at least as inexpensive and convenient as the 
...!/ see Noll, Peck and McGowan, Economic AsPects of Television 
Regulation, p. 67. 
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local second run theatre. At any rate, the STV industry se:es its 
pri¥Jary market. for movies as being in the first few years a.fter 
release, in competition with the neighborhood run. If STV 
is successful, it will reduce the duration of the neighborhood 
run by substituting for some of the latter's business, and 
thereby lead to an earlier release for conunercial television. 
If STV does not succeed in reducing thB second and third run, 
then it will have no effect on the release date to commercial 
television, which with a minor STV industry will continue to 
be determined by the duration of lucrative theatre exhibitions. 
Finally, it bears repeating that the most optimistic 
projections of the size of the STV market still leave the 
vast majority of Americans not subscribing to the service. This 
means that an STV business that is extremely successful will 
still leave an enormously attractive market for movies on 
corrunercial television. If half the nation is offered STV, 
if twenty-five percent of those offered the service acutally 
buy it, and if, as was the case in Hartford, less than twenty-five 
percent of subscribers watch any given movie, then about 3 percent 
of the TV households will view the typical movie on STV. �onsidering 
that some households are likely to view a movie a second t�ne 
when it is offered free on commercial television, an STV industry 
of even this magnitude can have n o  appreciable affect on movie 
audiences on free television. 
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consequently, it is difficult to find any good �eason to 
deny STV access to movies. There is adequate programming for 
all modes of exhibiting films, and the impact of even a 
fantastically successful STV industry on commercial television 
is likely to be so small as to be imperceptible, arrl may, 
for the reasons given above, actually bring movies to commercial 
television sooner after release than is now the case. 
Finally, the rules with respect to sports events are 
perhaps the most difficult to deal with, in part because of 
the fanatical attitude of most people towards sports. If 
S'IV offers a threat to commercial television in any program 
category, it is in sports. In fact, several sports events 
have already switched in that they are exhibited through 
closed-circuit television in theatres. For instance, the 
last World Cup soccer matches, which would not rank high on 
most Americans' lists of sports events, were shown only in 
t.�eatres, whereas four years ago the matches were carried by a 
commercial network. SL'l1ilarly, championship boxing events 
long ago abandoned free television for the theatre. 
Nevertheless, STV has an important potential benefit with 
respect to sports. If STV can be an important source of 
revenue to sports enterprises, it will make possible the 
emergence of new leagues in the professional team sports. 
Thusfar, the emergence of new leagues has been the only suc­
cessful mechanism for introducing competition into professional 
sports, to the benefit of players (teams new compete for player 
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services in every major team sport but baseball}, of fan�; 
(competition among ·leagues increases the availability of games 
on television and in person) and of broadcasters {the World 
Football League and the Hughes Television Network have g.i.Ven 
independent stations the opportunity to participate in the 
presentation of major league professional football and, thereby, 
capture very handsome prime time ratings in competition with 
the n�tworks). Thus, if STV can be used as a vehicle fox' 
promoting competition in sports without actually causing sports 
broad casts on cornrr1ercial television to disappear, it will 
constitute a major advance to all concerned except those 
sports enterprises that "° uld lose a monopolistic position in 
seiling tickets and broadcasting r.i.ghts. 
The difficulty in devising a rule for sports is the disparity 
of practices among sports enterprises in broadcast policies. 
Even within the same sport; some teams televise many· times as 
many games as others. Only in football, where all regular season 
games are sold as parts.of national broadcasting contracts, is 
the practice relatively uniform, but even there teams vary 
considerably in their policies with respect to preseason games. 
It does no� seem to make much sense to deny teams access to t.�e 
STV market if they have broadcast a large number of games, while 
teams that have steered clear of television are given es·sentially 
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unlimited access to STV; 
One way out is a rule along the following l ines. Let every 
team sell some proportion of its games to STV, such as one-third 
or one-half .  The normal practice of tearns is to televise few, 
if any, home games ,  on the theory that free telecasts destroy 
home game attendance, but to televise a substantial nwnber of 
road games. Thus, a sensible rule would be to allow all or 
nearly all of home games to be sold to STV, but to reserve all 
or nearly all road games for conunercial television, unles s ,  
for a fairly long period, even road games were not televised. 
Individual sports require a different type of rule. Most 
telecasts of individual sports focus only on the closing 
stages of a tournament: the last few holes of a golf tournament 
on each of the last two days of the tournament, the finals of 
a tennis tournament or a track meet. The true sports enthusiast, 
who might ba a potential STV customer, wouldpotentially be 
interested in the whole affair, from the very beginning. Thus , 
a revised antis iphoning ruling might appear as follows : that 
STV can bargain for the rights to any part of any event that is 
already appearing in part on cor:unercial television if it so 
chooses . Thus ,  if commercial television elects to televise only 
the finals of the U.S. open Tennis �ournament at Forest Hills, 
STV would still be able to pick up the earlier matches . Or, if 
commercial television decides to televise the NCF..A track meet 
on a delayed basis, showing it a week after the event takes 
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pl ace, STV would be per�itted to produce a live broadcast of the 
same event. The key to the rule would be tn prohibit STV to 
ir,terfere wi th broadcasters in obtaining rights to an event, 
but to supplement the broadcast service should there be a 
market for more complete coverage. In addition, of course, 
the normal ai1tisiphoning rule would apply in that a particular 
tournament could not switch from commercial to pay televis ion 
without waiting for two yea�s. 
The last category of programs, regular series, are not 
discussed in the Further Notice, but here, more than for any 
other type of programming4 the neyessity of restric itve rules 
i s  highly dubious. Each year literally scores of ideas for 
series are made into pilots, and many promising ideas are not 
picked up by the networks s imply because the amount of national 
network time is so limited. Given the resources available to 
the programming· industry and the extraordinarily high unemployment 
rates among actor s �  the�e is s imply no good reason to prevent 
STV from having · access to these types of offering s .  A minimal 
step in the right d irection would be to permit STV exhibit'.i.on of 
new episodes of any series or sequence of movies with a continuing 
cast of· characters that is rejected as a pilot or cancelled by 
the commercial networks . As argued above, there is s imply no 
threat at all that popular series will massively shift to BTV. 
The program production industry can always supply good series for 
free exhibition , undercutting the dew.and for STV series , and, 
in any event, consumers s imply are not going to be willing 
in sufficient nt<rubers to devoti:r a large portion of their vi.ewing 
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time to pay television. But in some specific cases, relatively 
small but very. loyal audiences may be willing to pay enough for 
a series that is not designed to maximize the size of the audience 
to make it commercially viable. Every year the commercial networks 
cancel one or two series that have low ratings but that nonetheless 
have v�ry devoted audiences who loudly express disapproval at the 
cancellation. If STV can create a regular series format that can 
attract a small, paying audience, it might thereby make a 
signific�nt contribution to television diversity. Right now, this 
does not appear likely, since STV is too small a factor in the 
market for programming to be able to support productions as costly 
as a reg�lar series . But in the future, as it grows, STV might 
be able to display considerable originality in its offerings in 
ways that really offer no direct competition with commercial 
television but nevertheless £all within the " regular series " rubric. 
Certainly it is a mistake to foreclose the possibility of such 
innovative behavior .  
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